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Abstract 
 
The purpose of this study is to investigate whether discretionary provisioning by Western European 
banks is driven by income smoothing or credit risk considerations. We find evidence that 
discretionary provisioning by Western European banks is driven by income smoothing incentives in 
the post-financial crisis period, particularly, among listed banks. Also, we observe that discretionary 
provisioning is significantly influenced by credit risk factors, mainly, non-performing loans and loan 
growth. Also, we find that discretionary provisioning by Western European banks is procyclical with 
fluctuations in the economic cycle. Overall, the implication of the findings is that discretionary 
provisioning among Western European banks is driven by both income smoothing and credit risk 
considerations. 
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 1. Introduction 
In this paper, we investigate whether discretionary provisioning among Western European banks is 
driven by credit risk or income smoothing considerations. Bank loan loss provisions play an important 
role in micro-prudential regulation of banks. Under Basel II, bank capital should be sufficient to cover 
unexpected losses while loan loss provisions (and loan loss reserves) should cover expected losses on 
bank loan portfolio (BCBS, 2004). Accordingly, European banks are required to set aside ‘specific 
provisions’ to cover probable impaired loans and make ‘general provisions’ to cover loan losses 
arising from fluctuations in the business cycle (FSF, 2009). After the 2007 to 2009 financial crisis, 
bank regulators in Europe introduced strict rules on bank provisioning and risk-taking behaviour, and 
such rules were intended to ensure that the provisioning of Western European banks is driven by 
credit risk considerations. In this paper, we argue that discretionary provisioning will be driven by 
credit risk considerations if bank managers are more concerned about the credit quality of their loan 
portfolio in the post-financial crisis period, or discretionary provisioning will be driven by income 
smoothing incentives if bank managers are more concerned about earnings stability (or opportunistic 
earnings management) in the post-financial crisis period. To date, it is not clear whether the 
provisioning behaviour of Western European banks is driven by credit risk or income smoothing 
considerations particularly after the 2007 to 2009 financial crisis.  
Moreover, prior European studies examine bank provisioning practices in the pre-crisis period [e.g. 
Leventis et al, 2011 (examine 1999 to 2008); Curcio and Hasan, 2015 (examine 1996 to 2006); Skala, 
2015 (examine Central European banks from 2004 to 2012)]. In contrast to Skala (2015), the present  
study examine the case of Western European banks to investigate whether loan loss provisioning of 
Western European banks is driven by credit risk or income smoothing considerations before and after 
the financial crisis.  
The study employs bank data from Bankscope from 16 Western European countries and finds that 
discretionary provisioning by Western European banks is driven by both income smoothing and credit 
risk considerations. This study contributes to the literature that investigate the determinants of loan 
loss provisions. We add to this strand of literature by providing evidence that managerial provisioning 
decisions in Western Europe is driven by both income smoothing and credit risk considerations. Also, 
by focusing on the context of Western European banks, we contribute to the income smoothing 
literature by providing another evidence for income smoothing in Europe. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the literature review and 
develops the hypotheses. Section 3 presents the data and methodology. Section 4 presents the findings 
and Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Literature Review 
Kleimeier (2002) and Evans et al (2008) demonstrate that banking in Western Europe has become 
more competitive, more concentrated and more integrated in the last decade just before the 2008 
financial crisis. It was during this period (characterized by increased bank competition, concentration, 
and market integration) that Leventis et al (2011) examine income smoothing practices among 91 
listed European banks during 1999 to 2008 period. They investigate the impact of accounting 
disclosure (IFRS) on banks’ incentive to use loan loss provisions to smooth income and to manage 
regulatory capital. They find evidence for income smoothing via provisions. However, they observe 
that bank income smoothing behaviour is reduced after IFRS adoption in Europe. Bonin and Kosak 
(2013) investigate the provisioning practices of banks in emerging European countries during the 
1997 to 2010 period. They find evidence for income smoothing, capital management and 
macroeconomic procyclicality. Also, Curcio and Hasan (2015) investigate the provisioning and 
income smoothing practices of Euro-Area and non-Euro Area credit institutions using pre-crisis bank 
data, during 1996 to 2006 period. They find that non-Euro Area banks use provisions to smooth 
income. However, they observe that Euro-Area banks did not smooth income possibly because they 
were concerned about the credit quality of bank loan portfolio. Jointly, Bonin and Kosak (2013) and 
Curcio and Hasan (2015)’s findings show that discretionary provisioning in the pre-crisis period was 
driven by income smoothing and capital management considerations than by credit risk 
considerations. Other non-EU studies find similar evidence for income smoothing in the pre-crisis 
period (e.g. Bhat, 1996; Lobo and Yang, 2001; Kanagaretnam et al, 2004; El Sood, 2012; Balboa et 
al, 2013; Ozili, 2016, etc.). 
In contrast to the pre-crisis banking environment, the post-crisis banking environment in Western 
Europe has become more regulated after the 2008 crisis (Temming, 2014), and only few studies use 
post-crisis EU bank data to investigate the impact of the regulatory environment on loan loss 
provisioning practices of EU banks. For example, Olszak et al (2016) investigate the determinants of 
bank loan loss provisions and procyclicality. They find that loan loss provisions of large and listed 
commercial banks is procyclical with business cycle fluctuations. Also, they observe that better 
investor protection and bank capital regulation reduce the procyclicality of loan loss provisions. Skala 
(2015) investigates the case of Central European banks during the 2004 to 2012 period and find that 
banks in the region use loan loss provisions to smooth income, and that provisions is procyclical with 
fluctuations in the economic cycle. Overall, there are few studies on bank loan loss provisioning 
practices in the post-financial crisis period. 
To develop the hypothesis, we predict a strong positive association between loan loss provisions and 
bank earnings if Western European banks increase (decrease) provisions to lower (increase) high 
(low) earnings in order to report stable earnings over time. This is consistent with the argument of the 
income smoothing hypothesis (Ahmed et al, 1999; Fonseca and Gonzalez, 2008; Leventis et al, 2011). 
Hypothesis: Western European banks use loan loss provisions to smooth bank earnings. 
On the other hand, we predict a negative association between loan loss provisions and bank earnings 
if bank provisions is driven by credit risk considerations rather than by income smoothing 
consideration. To date, conclusions to support the income smoothing hypothesis are mixed in the 
income smoothing literature (e.g. Ahmed et al, 1999; Lobo and Yang, 2001; Kanagaretnam et al, 
2004). 
 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1. Data 
The bank sample consists of selected Western European banking institutions in the Bankscope 
database. The countries include: United Kingdom, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Greece, Portugal, 
Belgium, Austria, Italy, France, Luxemburg, Spain, Netherland, Germany, Sweden, and Norway. The 
sample period cover the 2004 to 2013 period. All sample banks have December 31 fiscal year ends. 
The sample includes banks with required data for our tests from 2004 to 2013. Banks that have loan 
loss provisions data in Bankscope database for at least two consecutive years were included in the 
sample in order to control for quality of bank financial reporting. Year-2008 bank-year observations 
were excluded from the analysis to control for the adverse effect of the financial crisis from affecting 
our inference. The resulting final sample yields 114 banks consisting of 22 listed banks and 92 non-
listed banks. 
3.2. Methodology 
The baseline model specification adopted in this study follows the existing literature. 
𝐿𝐿𝑃 𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼0 +  𝛼1 𝑁𝑃𝐿 𝑖𝑡 +  𝛼2 𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁 𝑖𝑡 +  𝛼3 𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑃 𝑖𝑡 +  𝛼4 𝐶𝐴𝑅 𝑖𝑡 +  𝛼5 ∆𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗𝑡 
+  𝛼6𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 𝑖𝑡 +  𝜀 𝑖𝑡    … … … (1) 
Where, 
LLP = Ratio of loan loss provisions to total assets for bank i at time t. 
NPL = Ratio of impaired loans to gross loans for bank i at time t 
LOAN = Change in gross loan outstanding for bank i at time t. 
CAR = Ratio of actual tier 1 regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets for bank i at time t. 
EBTP = Ratio of earnings before taxes and loan loss provisions to total assets for bank i at time t. 
SIZE = Natural logarithm of total assets for bank i at time t. 
∆GDP = Change in gross domestic product for country j at period t. 
ε = Error term. 
 
Consistent with prior studies, the explanatory variables include non-performing loan (NPL), loan 
growth (LOAN), tier 1 capital (CAR), bank size (SIZE) and gross domestic product growth rate 
(∆GDP). NPL reflects the credit quality of banks (Beaver and Engel, 1996; Ahmed et al, 1999). NPL, 
an ex-post measure of the quality of bank loan portfolio, is considered to contain information on bank 
risk that is not captured by traditional measures of credit risk (Ahmed et al, 1999). We predict a 
positive sign for NPL coefficient because banks will increase provisions when they expect higher loan 
defaults. We use loan growth (LOAN) as a proxy for contemporaneous credit risk (Lobo and Yang, 
2001; Laeven and Majnoni, 2003; Kanagaretnam et al, 2003; Bushman and Williams, 2012). A 
positive sign for LOAN variable indicates that banks would increase provisions when loan supply 
increases to compensate for contemporaneous credit risk concerns. However, Lobo and Yang (2001) 
point out that a negative sign on the LOAN variable may be expected if there is improved quality of 
incremental loans which in turn would require fewer provisioning. Following the argument of Laeven 
and Majnoni (2003), we predict a positive sign for LOAN coefficient. CAR variable reflects banks’ 
use of provisions to manage regulatory capital (Ahmed et al, 1999; Anandarajan et al, 2007; Kilic et 
al, 2012; Bonin and Kosak, 2013). We expect a negative sign for CAR coefficient if banks increase 
provisions when they have low Tier 1 capital ratio. Also, we use the natural logarithm of total assets 
(SIZE) as a proxy for bank size. Kilic et al (2012), Ozili (2015) and Curcio and Hasan (2015) also use 
the SIZE variable. Large banks are considered to have higher levels of business activities and tend to 
keep more provisions to compensate for their high level of business activities compared to smaller 
banks (Anandarajan et al, 2003). Accordingly, we expect a positive relationship between SIZE and 
LLP. At country level, ΔGDP controls for economic fluctuations for each country. The use of ΔGDP 
to capture changes in economic activity for each country is common across the literature (e.g. Bikker 
and Metzemakers, 2005; Floro, 2010, etc.). Consistent with prior studies, we expect a negative 
relationship between LLP and ∆GDP because banks will increase provisions during bad economic 
periods (recessionary periods), and keep fewer provisions during good economic periods (Laeven and 
Majnoni, 2003; Bikker and Metzemakers, 2005; Floro, 2010, etc.). 
The coefficients of interest in the analysis are NPL, LOAN, EBTP and POST*EBTP coefficients. The 
income smoothing variable (EBTP) is included to test whether Western European banks use loan loss 
provisions to smooth income. We introduce POST dummy variable that take the value ‘1’ for the 
post-financial crisis period (2009-2013) and ‘0’ for the pre-crisis period (2004-2007). We interact 
POST with EBTP to detect whether income smoothing via provisions is pronounced in the post-
financial crisis period compared to the pre-financial crisis period. The use of POST*EBTP interaction 
term is consistent with Anandarajan et al (2007) who examine the case of Australian banks. We 
interpret a significant and positive sign for EBTP and POST*EBTP coefficients as evidence for the 
use of provisions to smooth income. We also interpret a significant and positive sign for NPL and 
LOAN coefficients as evidence for the use of provisions for credit risk purposes because banks will 
keep more provisions when they expect higher NPL and LOAN.  
 
4. Empirical Result 
4.1. Descriptive Statistics and Correlation 
Descriptive statistics for the full sample from 2004 to 2013 is presented in Table 1. Loan loss 
provisions (LLPs), on average, is 0.37% while pre-provisions and pre-tax earnings (EBTP) is 0.74%. 
Capital management variable (CAR), on average, is 11.34% while bank size (SIZE) is 18.59. Change 
in gross loan (LOAN) is 4.53% while non-performing loan (NPL), on average, is 4.32%.  
[Insert Table 1] 
Table 2 reports the correlation coefficients and the associated p-values for each variable. LLP is 
positively correlated with EBTP (0.085), and suggests that an increase in earnings (EBTP) is followed 
by increase in loan loss provisions (LLP). LLP is negatively correlated with SIZE (-0.058). On the 
other hand, LLP is negatively correlated with CAR (-0.037), and supports the capital management 
hypothesis that propose a negative relationship between CAR and LLP. LLP coefficient is negatively 
correlated with ∆GDP (-0.159), and indicates that provisioning by Western European banks is 
procyclical with fluctuations in the economic cycle. LLP is negative and significantly correlated with 
LOAN (-0.151), and indicates that higher bank lending is followed by fewer provisions. LLP is 
positively correlated with NPL (0.768), and indicates that banks increase provisions when they expect 
higher loan losses. Finally, the correlation between the independent variables are not too high, hence, 
multicollinearity is not an issue in the analysis. 
[Insert Table 2] 
 
4.2. Estimation Results 
The result is reported in Table 3. Column 1 reports the pooled regression results for the full bank 
sample. EBTP coefficient (t = 2.16) is positive and significant at 5% level, and provide support for the 
income smoothing hypothesis. Leventis et al (2011) find similar evidence. POST*EBTP coefficient is 
negative and insignificant in Column 2, and indicates that the use of provisions to smooth earnings is 
not pronounced during the post-financial crisis period compared to the pre-financial crisis period.  
With respect to the control variables in Column 1, NPL coefficient (t = 8.28) is positive and 
significant at 1% level, and indicates that Western European banks increase provisions when they 
expect higher non-performing loans. LOAN coefficient (t = 3.57) is positive and significant, and 
implies that Western European banks keep more provisions when they increase bank lending. CAR 
coefficient (t = -0.11) is negative and insignificant. SIZE coefficient (t = -0.49) is insignificant. ∆GDP 
coefficient (t = -3.37) is negative and significant at 1% level, and indicates that provisioning by 
Western European banks is procyclical with fluctuations in the economic cycle. Interestingly, ∆GDP 
coefficient is significant in all estimation in Table 3. 
[Insert Table 3] 
 
4.3. Sensitivity Analysis 
First, we test whether listed1 banks use provisions to smooth income. The result is reported in Column 
3 of Table 3. LISTED*EBTP coefficient is insignificant. Secondly, we use the interaction term 
LISTED*POST*EBTP to test whether income smoothing is pronounced among listed banks in the 
post-crisis period compared to non-listed banks in the pre-crisis period. LISTED*POST*EBTP 
coefficient is insignificant in Column 4 while the coefficient of the credit risk variables (NPL and 
LOAN) remain significant. Further, we divide the full sample into two sub-samples: listed banks and 
non-listed banks to test whether listed and non-listed banks use provisions to smooth reported 
earnings during the post-crisis period relative to the pre-crisis period. For the listed banks sub-sample 
(Column 6), POST*EBTP coefficient is positive and significant, and implies that listed banks use 
provisions to smooth income to a greater extent during the post-financial crisis period compared to the 
pre-financial crisis period. For the non-listed banks sub-sample (Column 8), POST*EBTP coefficient 
is insignificant, and implies that non-listed banks do not use provisions to smooth income to a greater 
extent in the post-financial crisis period compared to the pre-financial crisis period. 
[Insert Table 3] 
Furthermore, in Table 4 we perform additional tests with respect to the sample period. We divide the 
full sample into two sub-samples: pre-financial crisis period (2004-2007) and the post-financial crisis 
period (2009-2013). EBTP coefficient is positive and significant in Column 1 and 3, and indicates that 
banks use provisions to smooth income in the pre-and post-crisis period while the coefficient of the 
credit risk variables (NPL and LOAN) also remain significant. However, EBTP coefficient is more 
significant in the post-crisis period. This suggests that provisioning by Western European banks 
during the post-crisis period is driven by income smoothing and credit risk considerations. Finally, we 
use the pre- and post-crisis subsample category to test again whether listed banks use provisions to 
smooth income to a greater extent compared to non-listed banks. LISTED*EBTP coefficient is 
insignificant in Column 2 and 4 while the coefficient of the credit risk variables (NPL and LOAN) 
remain significant. 
[Insert Table 4] 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
In this study, we investigate whether discretionary provisioning by Western European banks is driven 
by income smoothing or credit risk considerations. We find evidence that discretionary provisioning 
by Western European banks is driven by income smoothing incentives in the post-financial crisis 
period, particularly, among listed banks. We also find that bank provisioning is procyclical with 
fluctuations in the economic cycle. Also, we observe that credit risk factors (NPLs and LOANs) 
significantly influence the level of bank provisions throughout the analysis. Hence, we conclude that 
                                                          
1 We distinguish between listed and non-listed banks based on the list of companies provided available at the 
London Stock Exchange (LSE) updated as at 30th April, 2015. We use the London Stock Exchange as a proxy 
for the capital market because it is considered to be the most diverse capital market in Europe with regional 
company listing in Europe. The classification yields 22 listed banks and 92 non-listed banks. We note that the 
small number of listed bank may affect our inference. 
discretionary provisioning among Western European banks is driven by both income smoothing and 
credit risk considerations. 
Assuming one goal of bank supervisors is to ensure that discretionary provisions is driven solely by 
credit risk considerations, our empirical results confirm that discretionary provisioning by Western 
European banks reflects credit risk considerations. However, for the purpose of policy making, bank 
supervisors in Western Europe should find ways to ensure that discretionary provisioning is driven 
solely by credit risk considerations while discouraging the use of provisions to smooth income. Future 
research could investigate other credit risk factors that influence the level of discretionary provisions 
among Western European banks. Also, future research could investigate whether discretionary 
provisions is influenced by the risk culture of banks in Western Europe, Central Europe and Emerging 
Europe. 
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 List of Tables 
Table 1: Summary of Descriptive Statistics 
Full Sample (2004-2013) 
Variable Mean Median S.D Observations 
LLP 0.004 0.001 0.009 923 
EBTP 0.007 0.006 0.007 923 
LOAN 0.045 0.037 18.61 842 
NPL 0.043 0.024 5.95 671 
CAR (%) 11.3 10.00 5.44 707 
SIZE 18.59 18.39 1.41 925 
ΔGDP 1.59 2.14 2.67 1026 
SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets. LOAN is the loan growth rate or 
change in gross loan outstanding. LLP is the ratio of loan loss provisions to 
total assets. NPL is the ratio of impaired loans to gross loans. ΔGDP is change 
in gross domestic product. CAR is tier 1 regulatory capital to risk-weighted 
asset ratio expressed in percentage. EBTP is the ratio of pre-provisions and pre-
tax earnings to total asset. 
 
 
 
Table 2: Pearson Correlation Coefficients of Key Variables  
         
         Correlation LLP  NPL  LOAN  EBTP  CAR  ΔGDP  SIZE   
LLP  1.000        
         
         
NPL  0.768*** 1.000       
 0.000         
         
LOAN  -0.151*** -0.321*** 1.000      
 0.000 0.000       
         
EBTP  0.085** -0.005 0.268*** 1.000     
 0.048 0.911 0.000      
         
CAR  -0.037 -0.001 -0.271*** -0.162*** 1.000    
 0.384 0.975 0.000 0.000      
         
ΔGDP  -0.159*** -0.126*** 0.289*** 0.044 -0.077* 1.000   
 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.303 0.075    
         
SIZE  -0.058 -0.050 -0.024 -0.098** -0.008 -0.036 1.000  
 0.175 0.242 0.576 0.023 0.850 0.401    
         
***, ** and * denote significant difference at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. EBTP is the ratio of pre-
tax and pre-provisions earnings to total assets. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets. LOAN is the 
change in outstanding loans. LLP is the ratio of loan loss provisions to total assets. NPL is the ratio of impaired 
loans to gross loans. ΔGDP is change in gross domestic product. CAR is tier 1 regulatory capital. 
 
 
 
 
 
         
 
 
 
  
Table 3: Main Regression Result (OLS results) 
 Full Sample Listed Banks Non-Listed Banks 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Variable Exp 
Sign 
coefficient 
t-statistic 
coefficient 
t-statistic 
coefficient 
t-statistic 
coefficient 
t-statistic 
coefficient 
t-statistic 
coefficient 
t-statistic 
coefficient 
t-statistic 
coefficient 
t-statistic 
c ? -0.001 
(-0.15) 
-0.0003 
(-0.07) 
-0.001 
(-0.26) 
-0.001 
(-0.12) 
-0.007* 
(-1.71) 
-0.009** 
(-2.37) 
-0.002 
(-0.36) 
-0.003 
(-0.44) 
EBTP + 0.104** 
(2.16) 
0.121 
(1.15) 
0.084 
(1.57) 
0.086* 
(1.68) 
0.341*** 
(7.17) 
0.174** 
(2.38) 
0.077 
(1.30) 
0.164 
(1.22) 
POST*EBTP +/-  -0.024 
(-0.21) 
   0.277*** 
(3.17) 
 
 
-0.109 
(-0.74) 
POST ?  -0.001 
(-0.77) 
 -0.002 
(-1.63) 
 -0.002 
(-1.36) 
 -0.0003 
(-0.19) 
NPL + 0.001*** 
(8.28) 
0.001*** 
(8.29) 
0.002*** 
(12.44) 
0.002*** 
(15.11) 
0.0006*** 
(6.24) 
0.0006*** 
(5.73) 
0.002*** 
(11.62) 
0.002*** 
(18.90) 
LOAN + 0.0001*** 
(3.57) 
0.0001*** 
(3.04) 
0.0001*** 
(3.57) 
0.0001*** 
(3.06) 
-0.0001** 
(-2.42) 
-0.0001** 
(-2.21) 
0.0001*** 
(3.61) 
0.0001*** 
(3.09) 
CAR - -0.0001 
(-0.11) 
0.0002 
(0.30) 
-0.0001 
(-0.12) 
0.00002 
(0.37) 
-0.0002* 
(-1.94) 
-0.0002* 
(-1.66) 
0.0002 
(0.25) 
0.0004 
(0.51) 
SIZE + -0.0001 
(-0.49) 
-0.0001 
(-0.46) 
-0.0001 
(-0.27) 
-0.0001 
(-0.26) 
0.0004** 
(1.98) 
0.0006*** 
(2.92) 
-0.0001 
(-0.17) 
-0.00003 
(-0.08) 
ΔGDP - -0.0004*** 
(-3.37) 
-0.005*** 
(-3.65) 
-0.0004*** 
(-3.30) 
-0.0005*** 
(-3.59) 
-0.0004*** 
(-3.46) 
-0.0003** 
(-2.27) 
-0.0004*** 
(-2.69) 
-0.0005*** 
(-2.91) 
LISTED*EBTP +   0.114 
(0.92) 
     
LISTED ?   -0.001 
(-0.72) 
-0.001 
(-0.62) 
    
LISTED*POST*EBTP ?    0.116 
(1.04) 
    
Adjusted R²  60.86 60.85 60.78 60.86 62.44 66.27 61.60 61.57 
F-stat 
(p-value) 
 141.20 
(0.000) 
106.14 
(0.000) 
105.78 
(0.000) 
94.47 
(0.000) 
30.64 
(0.000) 
27.28 
(0.000) 
116.78 
(0.000) 
87.35 
(0.000) 
Observation  542 542 542 542 108 108 434 434 
***, ** and * denotes significance levels at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10, respectively. EBTP is the ratio of pre-tax and pre-provisions earnings to total assets. SIZE 
is the natural logarithm of total assets. LOAN is the change in gross loans outstanding. LLP is the ratio of loan loss provisions to total assets. NPL is the ratio 
of impaired loans to gross loans. ΔGDP is change in gross domestic product. CAR is tier 1 regulatory capital to risk-weighted asset ratio. POST is a dummy 
variable that take the value one for post-crisis period from 2009 to 2013, and zero for the pre-crisis period from 2004 to 2007. POST*EBTP is the interaction 
term that measures the extent that banks use provisions to smooth income in the post-crisis period relative to the pre-crisis period. LISTED*EBTP is the 
interaction term that measures the extent that listed banks use provisions to smooth income compared to non-listed banks. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 4: Regression (Sensitivity Analysis) 
 Full Sample (Pre-crisis) Full Sample (Post-crisis) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variable Expected 
Sign 
coefficient 
t-statistic 
coefficient 
t-statistic 
coefficient 
t-statistic 
coefficient 
t-statistic 
c ? -0.005** 
(-1.99) 
-0.007** 
(-2.37) 
-0.007* 
(-1.71) 
-0.003 
(-0.43) 
EBTP + 0.149*** 
(4.76) 
0.177*** 
(4.77) 
0.341*** 
(7.17) 
0.037 
(0.55) 
LISTED*EBTP +/-  -0.075 
(-1.03) 
 0.223 
(1.29) 
LISTED ?  0.0002 
(0.27) 
 -0.002 
(-0.96) 
NPL + 0.0007*** 
(7.53) 
0.001*** 
(4.77) 
0.0006*** 
(6.24) 
0.002*** 
(12.51) 
LOAN + -0.0002* 
(-1.85) 
-0.0001** 
(-1.96) 
-0.0001** 
(-2.42) 
-0.0001** 
(-2.21) 
CAR - 0.0001 
(1.29) 
0.0001 
(1.31) 
-0.0002* 
(-1.94) 
-0.0001 
(-0.63) 
SIZE + 0.0002* 
(1.72) 
0.0003** 
(2.07) 
0.0004** 
(1.98) 
-0.00003 
(-0.09) 
ΔGDP - -0.0006 
(-0.35) 
-0.0001 
(-0.48) 
-0.0004*** 
(-3.46) 
-0.0005*** 
(-3.46) 
Adjusted R²  34.01 34.23 62.44 61.04 
F-stat 
(p-value) 
 14.57 
(0.000) 
11.28 
(0.000) 
30.64 
(0.000) 
75.79 
(0.000) 
0bservation  159 159 108 383 
***, ** and * denotes significance levels at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10, respectively. EBTP is the ratio of pre-tax and pre-
provisions earnings to total assets. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets. LOAN is the change in gross loans 
outstanding. LLP is the ratio of loan loss provisions to total assets. NPL is the ratio of impaired loans to gross loans. ΔGDP 
is change in gross domestic product. CAR is tier 1 regulatory capital. LISTED is a dummy variable that take the value one 
for listed Western European banks, and zero otherwise. LISTED*EBTP is the interaction term that measures the extent that 
listed banks use provisions to smooth income compared to non-listed banks. 
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